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Is lifetime inequality mainly due to differences across people established early in life or to differences
in luck experienced over the working lifetime? We answer this question within a model that features
idiosyncratic shocks to human capital, estimated directly from data, as well as heterogeneity in ability
to learn, initial human capital, and initial wealth -- features which are chosen to match observed properties
of earnings dynamics by cohorts. We find that as of age 20, differences in initial conditions account
for more of the variation in lifetime utility, lifetime earnings and lifetime wealth than do differences
in shocks received over the lifetime. Among initial conditions, variation in initial human capital is
substantially more important than variation in learning ability or initial wealth for determining how
an agent fares in life. An increase in an agent's human capital affects expected lifetime utility by raising
an agent's expected earnings profile, whereas an increase in learning ability affects expected utility

















To what degree is lifetime inequality due to di®erences across people established early in
life as opposed to di®erences in luck experienced over the lifetime? Among initial conditions,
individual di®erences established early in life, which ones are the most important?
A convincing answer to these questions is of fundamental importance. First, and most
simply, an answer serves to contrast the potential importance of the myriad policies directed
at modifying or at providing insurance for initial conditions (e.g. public education) against
those directed at shocks over the lifetime (e.g., unemployment insurance programs). Second,
a discussion of lifetime inequality cannot go too far before discussing which type of initial
condition is the most critical for determining how one fares in life. Third, a useful framework
for answering these questions should also be central in the analysis of a wide range of policies
considered in macroeconomics, public ¯nance and labor economics.
We view lifetime inequality through the lens of a risky human capital model. Agents
di®er in terms of three initial conditions: initial human capital, learning ability and ¯nancial
wealth. As agents age, they accumulate human capital by optimally dividing their available
time between market work and human capital accumulation. Human capital and labor
earnings are risky as human capital is subject to uninsured, idiosyncratic shocks each period.
We ask the model to account for key features of the earnings distribution dynamics by
cohorts. To this end, we document how mean earnings and measures of earnings dispersion
and skewness evolve for U.S. males. We ¯nd that mean earnings are hump shaped and that
earnings dispersion and skewness increase with age over most of the working lifetime.1
Our model produces a hump-shaped mean earnings pro¯le by a standard human capital
channel. Early in life earnings are low as agents allocate time to accumulating human capital.
Earnings rise as human capital accumulates and as a greater fraction of time is devoted to
market work. Earnings fall later in life because human capital depreciates and little time is
put into producing new human capital.
Two forces within the model account for the increase in earnings dispersion. One force is
that agents di®er in learning ability. Agents with higher learning ability have steeper mean
1Mincer (1974) documents related patterns in U.S. cross-section data. Deaton and Paxson (1994),
Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004), Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2005) and Huggett, Ventura
and Yaron (2006) examine cohort patterns in U.S. repeated cross section or panel data.
2earnings pro¯les than low ability agents, other things equal.2 The other force is that agents
di®er in idiosyncratic human capital shocks received over the lifetime.
To identify the contribution of each of these forces, we exploit the fact that the model
implies that late in life little or no new human capital is produced. As a result, moments of
the change in wage rates for these agents are almost entirely determined by shocks, rather
than by shocks and the endogenous response of investment in human capital to shocks
and initial conditions. We estimate the shock process from U.S. data using precisely these
moments. Given an estimate of the shock process and other model parameters, we choose
the initial distribution of ¯nancial wealth, human capital and learning ability across agents
to best match the earnings facts described above.3 We ¯nd that learning ability di®erences
are important in that they produce much of the rise in earnings dispersion over the lifetime,
given our estimates of the magnitude of human capital risk.
We use our estimates of shocks and initial conditions to quantify the importance of di®er-
ent proximate sources of lifetime inequality. We ¯nd that as of a real-life age of 20 di®erences
in initial conditions are more important than are shocks received over the remaining lifetime
as a source of variation in realized lifetime utility, lifetime earnings and lifetime wealth.4 We
¯nd that between 62 to 73 percent of the variation in lifetime utility and between 60 to 71
percent of the variation in lifetime earnings is due to variation in initial conditions. The
higher estimate for each statistic applies when the magnitude of shocks is set to our lowest
point estimate, whereas the lower estimate applies when the magnitude of shocks is set to
our highest point estimate. Intuitively, the greater the shock variance the smaller is the role
for initial conditions in accounting for the pattern of increasing earnings dispersion over the
lifetime.
Among initial conditions, we ¯nd that, as of age 20, variation in initial human capital is
substantially more important than variation in either learning ability or initial wealth for how
an agent fares in life. This analysis is conducted for an agent with the median value of each
initial condition. We ¯nd that a one standard deviation increase in initial wealth increases
2This mechanism is supported by the literature (see Card (1999)) on the shape of the mean age-earnings
pro¯les by years of education. It is also supported by the work of Lillard and Weiss (1979), Baker (1997) and
Guvenen (2006). They estimate a statistical model of earnings and ¯nd important permanent di®erences in
individual earnings growth rates.
3Since a measure of ¯nancial wealth is observable, we choose the tri-variate initial distribution to be
consistent with features of the distribution of wealth for young households.
4Lifetime earnings equals the present value of earnings, whereas lifetime wealth equals lifetime earnings
plus initial wealth.
3expected lifetime wealth by 3 to 4 percent. In contrast, a one standard deviation increase in
learning ability or initial human capital increases expected lifetime wealth by 9 to 10 percent
and 30 to 34 percent, respectively. We also analyze how an agent in the model values these
changes in initial conditions. Speci¯cally, we ask what is the permanent percentage change
in consumption which is equivalent for an agent in expected utility terms to these changes
in initial conditions. We ¯nd that the equivalent percentage changes in consumption are
roughly in line with how a change in initial condition impacts, in percentage terms, expected
lifetime wealth.
A leading and alternative view of lifetime inequality to the one analyzed in this paper is
presented in Storesletten et. al. (2004). The model analyzed in that paper is a standard,
incomplete-markets model in which labor earnings over the lifetime is exogenous.5 These
authors estimate an earnings process from U.S. panel data to match features of earnings over
the lifetime. Within their model, slightly less than half of the variation in realized lifetime
utility is due to di®erences in initial conditions.6
We note three di±culties related to this alternative incomplete-markets view. First, the
importance of idiosyncratic earnings risk may be overstated. The reason is that all of the
rise in earnings dispersion with age is attributed to shocks and none to initial conditions. In
our model learning ability di®erences lead to systematic di®erences in earnings growth rates
across agents. Lillard and Weiss (1979), Baker (1997) and Guvenen (2006) provide evidence
for such di®erences in permanent earnings growth rates in male earnings data. Second,
although the incomplete-markets model with exogenous earnings produces the rise in U.S.
within cohort consumption dispersion over the period 1980-90 documented by Deaton and
Paxson (1994), the rise in consumption dispersion is substantially smaller in U.S. data over
a longer time period. Our model produces less of a rise in consumption dispersion than the
exogenous-earnings model. A key reason for this is that part of the rise in earnings dispersion
is due to initial conditions. This component is anticipated by agents and therefore re°ected
in consumption dispersion early in life. Finally, the standard incomplete-market, life-cycle
model is not useful for some purposes. Speci¯cally, since earnings are exogenous, the model
gives up on theorizing about the underlying sources of earnings inequality. Thus, the model
5Similar models have been used in the macroeconomic literature on economic inequality. Recent papers
in this literature include Huggett (1996), Casta~ neda, Diaz-Jimenez and Rios-Rull (2003), Krueger and Perri
(2006), Guvenen (2006) and Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2006), among many others.
6In the context of a career-choice model, Keane and Wolpin (1997) ¯nd a more important role for initial
conditions. They ¯nd that unobserved heterogeneity realized at age 16 accounts for about 90 percent of the
variance in lifetime utility.
4can not shed light on how policy may a®ect inequality in lifetime earnings or may a®ect
welfare through earnings. Models with exogenous wage rates (e.g. Heathcote et. al. (2006))
face this criticism, but to a lesser extent, since most earnings variation is attributed to wage
variation. In our view, it is worthwhile to pursue a more fundamental approach that in
essence endogenizes wage rate di®erences via human capital theory.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 documents
earnings distribution facts and estimates properties of shocks. Section 4 sets model parame-
ters. Section 5 analyzes the model. Section 6 analyzes sources of lifetime inequality. Section
7 concludes.
2 The Model
We add risky human capital to the life-cycle, permanent-income framework.7 An agent's
preferences over consumption allocations are determined by a calculation of expected utility
as indicated below. Consumption cj(zj) at age j is risky as it depends on the j-period history
of human capital shocks zj. The set of possible j-period histories is denoted Zj ´ fzj =
(z1;:::;zj) : zi 2 Z;i = 1;:::;jg, where Z is a ¯nite set of possible shock realizations. P(zj)














An agent solves the decision problem below, taking initial ¯nancial wealth k1(1 + r),









(1) cj + kj+1 = kj(1 + r) + ej;8j and kJ+1 ¸ 0
7The model generalizes Ben-Porath (1967) to allow for risky human capital. Risky human capital is
modeled by extending the two-period models of Levhari and Weiss (1974) and Eaton and Rosen (1980) to a
multi-period setting. Krebs (2004) also analyzes a multi-period model of human capital with idiosyncratic
risk. Our work di®ers by its focus on lifetime inequality, among other di®erences.
5(2) ej = RjhjLj if j < JR, and ej = 0 otherwise.
(3) hj+1 = zj+1F(hj;lj;a);8j and Lj + lj = 1;8j
In this decision problem an agent faces a period budget constraint in which consumption
cj plus ¯nancial asset holding kj+1 equal earnings plus the value of assets brought into the
period. Financial assets pay a risk-free, real return r. Earnings ej before a retirement age
JR equal the product of a human capital rental rate Rj, an agent's human capital hj and
the fraction Lj of available time put into market work. Earnings are zero at and after the
retirement age JR. An agent's future human capital is determined by an idiosyncratic shock
zj+1 multiplying the law of motion for human capital F. The law of motion F depends
upon current human capital hj, time devoted to human capital production lj and an agent's
learning ability a, and is increasing in its three arguments.
We now comment on three key features of the model. First, while the earnings of an agent
are stochastic, the earnings distribution for a large cohort of agents evolves deterministically.
This occurs because the model has idiosyncratic but no aggregate risk.8 Second, the model
has two sources of growth in earnings dispersion within cohort - agents have di®erent learning
abilities and di®erent shock realizations. The next section characterizes empirically the rise
in US earnings dispersion. Third, the model implies that the nature of human capital shocks
can be identi¯ed from wage rate data, independently from all other model parameters. This
holds, as an approximation, towards the end of the working life because the model implies
that the production of human capital goes to zero. The next section develops the logic of
this point.
3 Data and Empirical Analysis
In this section we use data to address two issues. First, we characterize how mean earnings
and measures of earnings dispersion and skewness evolve with age for a cohort. Second, we
estimate a process for human capital shocks from wage rate data.
8More speci¯cally, P(zj) is both the probability that an agent receives a j-period shock history zj and
the fraction of the agents in a cohort that receive this shock history.
63.1 Age Pro¯les
The age pro¯les are based on earnings data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
1969-2004 family ¯les. We utilize earnings of males who are the head of the household, who
work between 520 and 5820 hours per year and who earn at least 2000 dollars (in 1968 prices).
We consider males between the ages of 21 and 62. These selection criteria are motivated by
several considerations. First, the PSID has many observations in the middle but relatively
fewer at the beginning or end of the working life cycle. By focusing on ages 21-62, we have
at least 100 observations in each age-year bin with which to calculate age and year-speci¯c
earnings statistics. Our age bins are centered 5-year age bins. For each year we therefore
have bins for ages 23- 60. Second, near the traditional retirement age there is a substantial
fall in labor force participation that occurs for reasons that are abstracted from in the model.
This suggests the use of a terminal age that is earlier than the traditional retirement age.
Let ej;t be the mean real earnings of agents who are age j at time t.9 The earnings
data can be viewed as being generated by several factors that we name cohort, time, and age
e®ects. Ultimately, we are interested in the age e®ect. However, as described in detail below,
this measure depends on the identifying assumptions regarding cohort and time e®ects. To
introduce notation, we denote a birth cohort as s = t ¡ j that is agents who were born in
year t¡j. We assume that ej;t is determined by cohort e®ects ®s, age e®ects ¯j, time e®ects
°t and shocks ²j;t. The relationship between these variables is given below both in levels and
in logs, where the latter is denoted by a tilde. Cohort e®ects can be viewed as e®ects that
are common to all agents who were born in a particular year (e.g., those who were born in
the Great Depression may have su®ered a permanent adverse shock). Time e®ects can be
viewed as e®ects that are common to all individuals alive at a point in time. An example
would be a temporary rise in the rental rate of human capital that increases the earnings of
all individuals in the period.
ej;t = ®s¯j°t²j;t
~ ej;t = ~ ®s + ~ ¯j + ~ °t + ~ ²j;t
9Real values are calculated using the CPI. To calculate ej;t we use a 5 year bin centered at age j. For
example, to calculate mean earnings of agents age j = 30 in year t = 1980 we use data on agents age 28¡32
in 1980.
7The linear relationship between time t, age j, and birth cohort s = t ¡ j limits the
applicability of this regression speci¯cation. Speci¯cally, without further restrictions the re-
gressors in this system are co-linear and these e®ects cannot be estimated. This identi¯cation
problem is well known.10 In e®ect any trend in the data can be arbitrarily reinterpreted as
due to year (time) e®ects or alternatively as due to age or cohort e®ects.
Given this problem, we provide two alternative measures of the age e®ects. These corre-
spond to the cohort e®ects case where we set ~ °t = 0; 8t and the time e®ects case where we
set ~ ®s = 0; 8s. We use ordinary least squares to estimate the coe±cients. For the cohort
e®ects case, the regression has J £T dependent variables regressed on J +T cohort dummies
and J age dummies. T and J denote the number of time periods in the panel and the number
of distinct age groups, which in our case equal J = 60 ¡ 23 and T = 2004 ¡ 1969. For the
time e®ects case the regression has J £T dependent variables regressed on T time dummies
and J age dummies. This regression has J less regressors than the regression incorporating
cohort e®ects.11
In Figure 1 we graph the age e®ects of the levels of earnings implied by each regres-
sion. Figure 1 highlights the familiar hump-shaped pro¯le of mean earnings. Figure 1 is
constructed by plotting ¯j from each regression above. The age e®ects ¯j are scaled so that
mean earnings equal 100 at the end of the working life cycle for the case of time e®ects.
A similar analysis is carried out to extract the age pro¯le of measures of earnings dis-
persion and skewness. We consider two standard measures of dispersion: the variance of log
earnings and the Gini coe±cient of earnings. We measure skewness by the ratio of mean
earnings to median earnings.
For each of these three statistics the procedure is the same. Let statj;t denote the earnings
statistic of interest calculated for age group j at time t.12 We then estimate the dummy
variable coe±cients in the regression equation below, setting either ®stat
s = 0 for the case of
time e®ects or °stat
t = 0 for the case of cohort e®ects. Figure 2 (a)-(c) plots the estimated
age dummy coe±cients after normalization so that the age pro¯le of each earnings statistic
10See Weiss and Lillard (1978) and Deaton and Paxson (1994) among others.
11A third approach, discussed in more detail in Huggett et. al. (2006), allows for age, cohort and time
e®ects but with the restriction that time e®ects are mean zero and are orthogonal to a time trend. That is
(1=T)
PT
t=1 ~ °t = 0 and (1=T)
PT
t=1 ~ °tt = 0. Thus, trends over time are attributed to cohort and age e®ects
rather than time e®ects. The results of this approach are e®ectively the same as those for cohort e®ects and
we therefore omit them for brevity.
12We, again, use 5-year age bins centered at age j to compute the statistic of interest at age j.










Figure 2 shows that both dispersion and skewness tend to increase with age in both
the time and cohort e®ects views. The cohort e®ect view in Figure 2(a) implies a rise in
the variance of log earnings of about 0.4 from age 23 to 60 whereas the time e®ects imply
a smaller rise of only about 0.2. The same qualitative pattern can be seen for the Gini
coe±cient measure of dispersion in Figure 2(b). Figure 2(c) shows that the rise in earnings
skewness with age is also greater for the cohort e®ect view than for the time e®ects view.
We will ask the model to best match the time e®ects view of the evolution of all three
features (i.e mean, dispersion and skewness) of the earnings distribution. Heathcote et. al.
(2005a) present an argument for stressing the time e®ects view. Their argument is based
in part on the fact that within-cohort and within-age group changes in earnings and wage
dispersion vary over time but that these two changes are of similar magnitude over the
sub-periods they examine. They argue that this fact suggests that time e®ects are key.
3.2 Human Capital Shocks
The model implies that an agent's wage rate, measured as market compensation per unit of
work time, equals the product of the rental rate and an agent's human capital. The model
also implies that late in the working life cycle human capital investments are approximately
zero. This occurs as the number of working periods over which the agent can reap the returns
to these investments falls as the agent approaches retirement. The upshot is that when there
is no human capital investment over a period of time, then the change in an agent's wage
rate is entirely determined by rental rates and the human capital shock process and not by
any other model parameters.13
This logic is restated in the equations below. The ¯rst equation indicates how the wage
wt+s is determined by rental rates Rt+s and shocks zt+s in the absence of human capital
investment. Here it is assumed that there is no human capital investment from period t to
t + s so that F(h;0;a) = h in all periods with no investment. The second equation takes
13Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) use a similar line of reasoning to estimate di®erences in rental rates
across skill groups within a model which abstracts from idiosyncratic risk.
9logs of the ¯rst equation, where a hat denotes the log of a variable.
wt+s ´ Rt+sht+s = Rt+szt+sF(ht+s¡1;0;a) = Rt+szt+s £ ::: £ zt+1ht
^ wt+s ´ logwt+s = ^ Rt+s +
s X
j=1
^ zt+i + ^ ht
Now let measured s-period log wage di®erences (denoted yt;s) be true di®erences plus mea-
surement error di®erences ²t+s¡²t. This is the ¯rst equation below. We assume that human
capital shocks and measurement errors (^ zt;²t) are jointly independent and are identically
distributed over time and people. We also assume that ^ zt » N(¹;¾2) and that V ar(²t) = ¾2
².
These assumptions imply the three cross-sectional moment conditions below.
yt;s ´ ^ wt+s ¡ ^ wt + ²t+s ¡ ²t = ^ Rt+s ¡ ^ Rt +
s X
j=1
^ zt+i + ²t+s ¡ ²t
E[yt;s] = ^ Rt+s ¡ ^ Rt + s¹
V ar(yt;s) = s¾2 + 2¾2
²
Cov(yt;s;yt;r) = r¾2 + ¾2
² for r < s
To make use of these moment restrictions, one needs to be able to measure the variable
yt;s and to have individuals for which the assumption of no time spent accumulating human
capital is a reasonable approximation. The focus on older workers addresses both issues.
Wage data for younger workers are potentially problematic for both issues. Speci¯cally, on
the ¯rst issue it may be di±cult to accurately measure the wage rates emphasized in the
model when measured time at work is a mix of work time and learning time.
We calculate wages in PSID data as total male labor earnings divided by total hours for
male head of household. We impose the same selection criteria as those presented in Section
3.1 for earnings. We follow males for either three years or four years. Thus, we calculate
two log wage di®erences (i.e. yt;s for s = 1;2) when males are followed for three years and
three log wage di®erences when males are followed for four years.14 In estimation we use
14The PSID data is not available for the years 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2003. In the years preceding those
10cross sectional variances and covariances aggregated across panel years. For each year we














t;r ¡ ¹t;r). We stack the moments across the panel years and use a
2-step GMM estimation with an identity matrix as the initial weighting matrix.
Table 1 provides the estimation results. Over the entire sample period the point estimate
of the standard deviation ¾ of the log shock to human capital is between 0:10 and 0:11 for
both the age group 50 ¡ 60 and 55 ¡ 65. This holds when we follow males for three years
(¹ s = 2) or for four years (¹ s = 3).15 This is smaller than the estimate which obtains when all
males 23¡60 are pooled together. From the point of view of human capital theory, pooling
younger and older workers will mean that the change in log wages will be determined by
shocks and by the endogenous response of human capital decisions to shocks and initial
conditions rather than by shocks alone. We note that the magnitude of the persistent wage
shocks estimated by Heathcote et. al. (2006) in PSID data when various age groups are
pooled is between our estimates for the older age groups and our estimate for the pooled
sample.
The lower part of Table 1 contains results for the period 1969-1981. The point estimates
of the shock variance is lower for each age group in this period than the estimates obtained
using the entire time period 1969-2004. This is consistent with the fact that the increase in
cross-sectional earnings inequality in the U.S. over this period occurred mainly after 1981.
Over the period 1969-1981 we ¯nd that the estimated variances for the 50-60 and the 55-65
age groups are smaller than the estimated variance when all age groups are pooled. This is
the same pattern that was found over the entire sample period.
4 Setting Model Parameters
The strategy for setting model parameters is in three steps. First, we estimate the parameters
governing human capital shocks directly. This was done in the previous section. Second,
we choose parameters governing the utility function and interest rates based upon previous
studies. Third, we set the parameters governing the distribution of initial conditions and
the parameter governing the elasticity of the human capital production function so that
years we impose that the agent is available for three consecutive years and use a two year growth rate.
15We have also analyzed several other age-panel year con¯gurations in order to gauge the potential sensi-
tivity to proximity to retirement years and have found no material di®erence in the point estimates.
11the model best matches the age pro¯les of the evolution of the male earnings distribution
estimated in the previous section. In choosing the initial distribution and elasticity, we take
all other model parameters as given.
Model parameter values are summarized in Table 2. We set the model period to be a
year. Agents live J = 56 model periods or from a real-life age of 20 to 75. We set a retirement
age at JR = 42 or at a real-life age of 61. At the retirement period an agent can no longer
engage in market work. The real interest rate in the model is set to r = 0:042. This is the
average of the annual return to stock and long-term bonds over the period 1946-2001 (see
Siegel (2002, Table 1-1 and 1-2)). The discount factor is set to ¯ = 1=(1+ r) so that absent
risk the consumption pro¯le solving the model is °at.
The utility function is of the constant relative risk aversion class. The parameter ½
governing risk aversion and intertemporal substitution is set to ½ = 2. This value lies in
the middle of the range of estimates based upon micro-level data which are surveyed by
Browning, Hansen and Heckman (1999, Table 3.1).
We set the value g governing the growth in the rental rate of human capital in the model
equal to the average growth rate of mean male earnings in US cross-section data. We calculate
that in the PSID over the period 1968-2001 the mean arithmetic growth rate of mean male
earnings equals 0:19 percent. The benchmark model, with homothetic preferences, implies
that the earnings distribution of di®erent cohorts is proportional to the initial level of this
rental rate, other things equal. Thus, with stable demographics the average cross-sectional
earnings in the model grows at rate g.
We set the standard deviation ¾ of the log human capital shocks to be consistent with
the estimates in Table 1. We analyze ¾ = 0:088 and ¾ = 0:108. These are respectively the
lowest and the highest point estimates from Table 1 for the 55 to 65 age group. We set ¹,
governing the mean log human capital shock, so that the model matches the average rate of
decline of mean earnings for the cohorts of older workers in US data that we documented
earlier in Figure 1. The fall in mean earnings in the model equals (1+g)e¹+¾2=2 when agents
make no human capital investments. Thus, ¹ is set, given the value g and ¾, so that this
holds.
We assume that the human capital production function is F(h;l;a) = h + a(hl)®, which
is the functional form analyzed in Ben-Porath (1967). We set the elasticity parameter ® and
the parameters governing the initial distribution G of human capital and learning ability to
12best match the three central features of the U.S. earnings distribution documented in section
3. The Appendix describes the distance metric between data and model statistics that we
minimize. We restrict the distribution G to lie in a parametric class. In the benchmark
model, initial assets are zero and initial human capital and learning ability are jointly log-
normally distributed so that log(x) » N(¹x;§), when x = (h1;a). We explore later in the
paper a tri-variate distribution, where the initial asset distribution matches features of net
wealth holdings for young households in the PSID.
When we examine the low shock case (i.e. ¾ = 0:088), we ¯nd that ® = 0:675 is the
parameter value which best matches the earnings facts. For the high shock case, we ¯nd
that ® = 0:625 best matches the data. We note that the parameter ® has been estimated in
the human capital literature. These estimates, surveyed by Browning et. al. (1999, Table
2.3- 2.4), lie in the range 0:5 to just over 0:9. These previous estimates, however, are based
upon models that abstract from idiosyncratic risk.
We have examined the ¯t of the model at prespeci¯ed values of the parameter ®, while
choosing the parameters of the initial distribution to best match the U.S. earnings facts. The
distance between model and data statistics displays a U-shaped pattern in the parameter
®, where the bottom of the U is the value in Table 2. This distance increases sharply for
values of ® exceeding 0:80. Over this range there is a strong tension between ¯tting the
dispersion pro¯le and the skewness pro¯le. If one were to ignore the skewness pro¯le in
choosing initial conditions, then the model would substantially overstate the rise in skewness
over the lifetime we ¯nd in U.S. data.
5 Earnings in the Model
In this section, we report on the ability of the model to reproduce the earnings facts docu-
mented in section 3.16 The analysis focuses on the benchmark model without initial wealth
di®erences.
16Methods used to compute solutions to the model are described in the Appendix.
135.1 Dynamics of the Earnings Distribution
The age pro¯les of mean earnings, earnings dispersion and skewness produced by the bench-
mark model are displayed in Figure 3(a)-(c). The model generates the hump-shaped earnings
pro¯le for a cohort by a standard human capital accumulation argument. Early in the work-
ing life cycle, individuals devote more time to human capital production than at later ages.
These time allocation decisions lead to a net accumulation of human capital in the early
part of the working life cycle. Thus, mean earnings increase with age as human capital and
mean time worked increase with age.
Towards the end of the working life-cycle, mean human capital levels fall. This happens as
the mean multiplicative shock to human capital is smaller than one (i.e. E[z] = e¹+¾2=2 < 1).
This corresponds to the notion that on average human capital depreciates. The implication
is that average earnings in Figure 3 fall late in life because growth in the rental rate of human
capital is not enough to o®set the mean fall in human capital.
Figure 4 shows the age pro¯le of the mean fraction of time allocated to human capital
production in the model. Approximately 25 percent of available time is directed at human
capital production early in life. After age 55 less than 5 percent of time is directed at human
capital production. Recall that for the purpose of identifying human capital shocks, we use
the assumption that time devoted to human capital production and, hence, human capital
production is negligible towards the end of the working lifetime.17
Two forces account for the rise in earnings dispersion in Figure 3. First, since individual
human capital is repeatedly hit by shocks, these shocks are a source of increasing dispersion
in human capital and earnings as a cohort ages. Second, di®erences in learning ability across
agents produce mean earnings pro¯les with di®erent slopes. This follows since within an age
group, agents with high learning ability choose to produce more human capital and devote
more time to human capital production than their low ability counterparts. Huggett et. al.
(2006, Proposition 1) establish that this holds in the absence of human capital risk. This
mechanism implies that earnings of high ability individuals are relatively low early in life
and relatively high late in life compared to agents with lower learning ability, holding initial
human capital equal.
17Mincer (1997) reviews evidence related to time allocation decisions. He cites evidence that time directed
at skill accumulation decreases with age for U.S. males.
145.2 Earnings Dispersion: Risk versus Ability Di®erences
We now try to understand the quantitative importance of risk and ability di®erences for
producing the increase in earnings dispersion displayed in Figure 3. We do so by alternatively
eliminating ability di®erences or eliminating shocks. The analysis focuses on the high shock
case where ¾ = 0:108.
5.2.1 Eliminating Ability Di®erences
We eliminate ability di®erences by changing the initial distribution so that all agents have
the same learning ability, which we set equal to mean ability. In the process of changing
learning ability, we do not alter any agent's initial human capital.
Figure 5(a) shows that eliminating ability di®erences leads to the striking result that
the rise in earnings dispersion over the lifetime is almost completely eliminated. This result
is due to two opposing forces. First, human capital risk leads ex-ante identical agents to
di®er ex-post in human capital and earnings. Second, the model has a force which leads
to decreasing dispersion in human capital and earnings with age which has received little
attention in work which interprets patterns of earnings dispersion over the lifetime. Without
risk and without ability di®erences, all agents within an age group produce the same amount
of new human capital regardless of the current level of human capital { see Huggett et. al.
(2006, Proposition 1). This holds for any value of the elasticity parameter ® of the human
capital production function. This implies that both the distribution of human capital and
earnings are Lorenz ordered by age. Thus, measures of earnings or human capital dispersion
that respect the Lorenz order decrease for a cohort as the cohort ages.
Figure 5(a) shows that earnings dispersion increases at the end of the working lifetime.
This occurs as human capital production at the end of life goes to zero because the time
allocated to production (see Figure 4) goes to zero. This means that the opposing force
leading to convergence is gradually eliminated with age.
5.2.2 Eliminating Idiosyncratic Risk
To highlight the role of human capital risk, we eliminate idiosyncratic risk altogether by
setting ¾ = 0. We adjust the mean log shock ¹ to keep the mean shock level constant but
15maintain all other initial conditions. This analysis is used in the next section to understand
the e®ects we observe when we change the shocks and at the same time allow the model to
re¯t the initial conditions. Removing idiosyncratic risk leads to a counter-clockwise rotation
of the mean earnings pro¯le and leads to a U-shaped earnings dispersion pro¯le. Figure 5(b)
shows the e®ect on earnings dispersion of eliminating risk.
When idiosyncratic risk is eliminated, human capital accumulation becomes more at-
tractive for risk-averse agents. Thus, all else equal, agents spend a greater fraction of time
accumulating human capital early in life. The result is a counter-clockwise movement in the
mean earnings pro¯le.18 In terms of dispersion in labor earnings, human capital shocks are
more important for agents with relatively high learning ability. These agents are the ones
who would allocate an even larger fraction of time into human capital accumulation for lower
values of the variance of idiosyncratic shocks. When human capital risk is eliminated, these
agents allocate less time to work early in life and more time to human capital accumulation.
5.3 Properties of the Initial Distribution
Table 3 summarizes properties of the distribution of initial conditions. These properties are
given both for the highest and lowest shock estimates and for the two estimated values of
the elasticity parameter ®. When the shock variance increases, the initial distributions that
best reproduce the earnings facts require higher levels of mean learning ability and lower
levels of ability dispersion and human capital dispersion. A consequence of the lower levels
of ability and human capital dispersion is a reduction in the relative importance of initial
conditions for lifetime inequality. We will see this shortly in the next section of the paper.
What accounts for these changes in the initial distributions? Recall from our previous
analysis that eliminating shocks for a given initial distribution and elasticity parameter leads
to a counter-clockwise rotation of the mean earnings pro¯le. This occurs because the time
input into human capital accumulation over the life cycle increases as human capital risk
decreases. This is consistent with the result of Levhari and Weiss (1974) whereby, in a two-
period model, risk-averse agents reduce human capital investments with human capital risk
compared to the no risk case.
18This is e®ectively the central result of Levhari and Weiss (1974) extended to a multi-period setting.
They showed in a two-period model that time input into human capital production is smaller with human
capital risk than without when agents are risk averse.
16Following this intuition, to produce the earnings facts as risk increases, holding the
elasticity parameter ¯xed, the distribution of initial conditions needs to be adjusted. A
higher mean learning ability level leads to a counter-clockwise rotation of the mean earnings
pro¯le to counteract the clockwise rotation of the mean earnings pro¯le produced by adding
risk to the model with ¯xed initial distribution. The intuition for why ability dispersion
falls as human capital risk increases is that human capital risk is itself a source of increased
earnings dispersion. Thus, greater human capital risk leaves less room for ability di®erences
in accounting for the rise in earnings dispersion with age.
6 Lifetime Inequality
6.1 Initial Conditions Versus Shocks
We decompose the variance in lifetime inequality into variation due to initial conditions
versus variation due to shocks. This is done for lifetime utility and lifetime earnings in
the benchmark model. Later on we also decompose the variance in lifetime wealth. Life-
time wealth equals the realized present value of earnings (i.e. lifetime earnings) plus initial
wealth.19 Such a decomposition makes use of the fact that a random variable can be written
as the sum of its conditional mean plus the variation from its conditional mean. As these
two components are orthogonal, the total variance equals the sum of the variance in the
conditional mean plus the variance around the conditional mean.
Table 4 presents lifetime inequality within the benchmark model. Lifetime inequality is
analyzed as of the start of the working life cycle, which we set to a real-life age of 20. We
¯nd that from 62 to 73 percent of the variation in lifetime utility and from 60 to 71 percent
of the variation in lifetime earnings is due to initial conditions. For each statistic, initial
conditions have a greater role when the the magnitude of shocks is set to our lowest point
estimate.
Figure 6 describes lifetime inequality as the elasticity parameter ® of the human capital
production function is varied over the interval [:5;:9]. This interval includes the values,
® = :625 and ® = :675, that best match the earnings pro¯les in the high and low shock cases.
19Lifetime utility and lifetime wealth along a lifetime shock history zJ are de¯ned as follows:
U(zJ;h1;k1;a) =
PJ




17Figure 6 shows that the fraction of the variance in lifetime utility and lifetime earnings that
is due to initial conditions falls as the elasticity parameter increases.
We now determine how the decomposition of lifetime inequality changes when we account
for variation in initial wealth found in U.S. data. To examine this issue, we use PSID net-
wealth data for households with a male head age 20 to 25.20 We express net wealth as a
ratio to mean male earnings in the age group 20 -25 in each year. We then pool these ratios
across years.
We maintain the multi-variate log-normal structure for describing initial conditions. How-
ever, we do allow for negative wealth holding. Speci¯cally, we approximate the empirical
pooled wealth distribution with a lognormal distribution which is shifted a distance ±. We
choose ± so that 95 percent of the distribution has a wealth to mean earnings ratio above
¡±. The distribution of the wealth-earnings ratio in the model is given by ex ¡ ±, where
x is distributed N(¹1;¾2
1). The parameters (¹1;¾2
1) are set equal to the sample mean and
sample variance of the log of the sum of the wealth-earnings ratio plus ± for ratios above
¡±. The median, mean and standard deviation of the wealth-earnings ratio in the model is
then (0:377;0:778;1:340).21 This implies that there is a substantial amount of initial wealth
dispersion within the model. Speci¯cally, a one standard deviation change in initial wealth
is 1:34 times mean yearly earnings for young agents.
The distribution of initial wealth, human capital and learning ability is selected to best
match the earnings facts documented earlier when ® is set to the corresponding value in
Table 2. The distribution is a tri-variate lognormal, where the parameters describing the
mean and variance of shifted log wealth are those calculated above in U.S. data. Thus,
wealth in the model is right skewed and mean wealth is more than double median wealth.
Table 5 analyzes lifetime inequality when initial wealth di®erences are set to the magni-
tudes we ¯nd in U.S. data. We ¯nd that initial conditions account for 66 to 77 percent of
the variation in lifetime utility, 61 to 72 percent of the variation in lifetime wealth and 59 to
71 percent of the variation in lifetime earnings.22 Thus, we ¯nd that when we account for
20The data is from the PSID wealth supplement for 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2001 and 2003. The sample
size is 1176 when pooled across these years.
21In the PSID sample we calculate that (¹1;¾2
1;±) = (¡0:277;0:849;0:381) and that the median, mean
and standard deviation of the wealth-earnings ratio is (0:313;0:776;1:432).
22Our results for lifetime earnings inequality are close to some existing results that are based upon a
statistical model of earnings. Such a model does not attempt to explain how earnings arise endogenously
from optimal decisions over the life cycle. For example, Geweke and Keane (2000, Table 11) estimate such
18initial wealth di®erences the majority of the variation in lifetime inequality is due to initial
conditions.
6.2 How Important are Di®erent Initial Conditions?
The analysis so far has not addressed how important variation in one type of initial con-
dition is compared to variation in other types for how an agent fares in life. We analyze
the importance of di®erent initial conditions by asking the agents in the model how much
compensation is equivalent to starting life with a one standard deviation change in any initial
condition. We express this compensation, which we call an equivalent variation, in terms of
the percentage change in consumption in all periods that would be required to leave an agent
with the same expected lifetime utility as an agent with a one standard deviation change
in the relevant initial condition. The baseline initial condition is set equal to the mean log
values of initial human capital and learning ability and equal to the mean of the shifted
log initial wealth. The changes in initial conditions are also in standard deviations of log
variables.
The importance of changes in initial conditions, stated in terms of equivalent variations, is
presented in the upper panel of Table 6. We ¯nd that a one standard deviation movement in
log human capital is substantially more important than a one standard deviation movement
in either log learning ability or log initial wealth. A one standard deviation increase in initial
human capital is equivalent to a 31 ¡ 34 percent increase in consumption. In contrast, a
one standard deviation increase in learning ability or initial wealth is equivalent to an 6 ¡ 8
percent and 4 ¡ 5 percent increase in consumption, respectively. Thus, we ¯nd that an
increase in human capital leads to the largest impact, an increase in learning ability has the
next largest impact and an increase in initial ¯nancial wealth has the smallest impact on
equivalent variations.
We also analyze the importance of di®erent initial conditions by determining how changes
in initial conditions a®ect an agent's budget constraint. More speci¯cally, we determine the
percent by which an agent's expected lifetime wealth changes in response to a one standard
deviation change in an initial condition. The lower panel of Table 6 presents the results of
this analysis. In interpreting these results, it is useful to keep two points in mind. First, an
a model of male earnings using PSID data and ¯nd that initial conditions account for between 66 and 72
percent of the variation in the simulated present value of earnings from age 25 to 65.
19increase in human capital acts as a vertical shift of the expected earnings pro¯le, whereas
an increase in learning ability rotates this pro¯le counter clockwise. Second, the impact of
additional initial ¯nancial wealth is both through a direct impact on lifetime resources as
well as the indirect impact through earnings.
Broadly speaking, the lower panel of Table 6 ¯nds that the impact on expected lifetime
wealth of changes in initial conditions are roughly in line with their impact on equivalent
variations. Thus, a one standard deviation change in initial human capital has the greatest
impact, the corresponding change in learning ability has the next biggest impact and initial
wealth changes have the least important impact on expected lifetime wealth.23 We note,
however, that the impact of a one standard deviation change in learning ability on equiva-
lent variations and lifetime wealth displays a weaker link than for other initial conditions.
Speci¯cally, an increase in learning ability raises expected lifetime wealth substantially more
than it raises an agent's equivalent variation. Intuitively, this occurs because higher ability
leads to higher mean earnings and a higher earnings variance later in life but lowers earnings
early in life. Thus, with incomplete insurance markets, a risk-averse agent values such an
increase in expected lifetime wealth at less than the equivalent change in current wealth.
6.3 Consumption and Social Insurance Implications
One may argue that a useful model for analyzing lifetime inequality within an incomplete-
markets framework should also be broadly consistent in terms of its implications for consump-
tion inequality. We therefore compare the model's implications for the rise in consumption
dispersion over the lifetime with the patterns found in U.S. consumption data.
A number of studies analyze the variance of log adult-equivalent consumption in U.S.
data. These studies regress the variance of log adult-equivalent consumption for households
in di®erent age groups on age and time dummies or alternatively on age and cohort dummies.
The coe±cients on age dummies are then used to highlight how consumption dispersion varies
for a cohort with age.
Figure 7 plots the variance of log adult-equivalent consumption in U.S. data from two
23We also calculate expected lifetime wealth elasticities for an increase in each initial condition. At the
benchmark initial condition, the expected lifetime wealth elasticities are :692 to :723 for human capital, :356
to :414 for learning ability and :026 to :031 for initial wealth. For each initial condition, the larger (smaller)
elasticity corresponds to the high (low) shock case.
20such studies. Deaton and Paxson (1994) analyze U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX)
data from 1980 to 1990. Heathcote et. al. (2005a), Slesnick and Ulker (2005) and Primiceri
and van Rens (2006) reexamine this issue using CEX data over a longer time period. All
three of these later studies ¯nd that the rise in dispersion with age is substantially smaller
than the rise in Deaton and Paxson (1994).
The exogenous earnings model analyzed in Storesletten et. al. (2004) produces the rise
in consumption dispersion documented in Deaton and Paxson (1994). This is the case when
their exogenous earnings model has a social insurance system. We analyze the consumption
implications of our benchmark risky human capital model with a social insurance system.
Speci¯cally, we augment our benchmark model to include a social security system and
an income tax system. The model social security system features a proportional earnings
tax of 10:6 percent, which is the old-age and survivors insurance bene¯t tax rate in the
US social security system. The social security system has a common retirement bene¯t
paid to all agents after the retirement age set equal 45 percent of mean earnings in the last
period of the working lifetime. The income tax in the model captures the pattern of e®ective
average federal tax rates in the US documented in Congressional Budget O±ce (2004, Table
3A and 4A) for the tax year 2001. E®ective average federal tax rates in the US rise from
approximately 0 percent for low income households to approximately 20 percent for very
high income households.24 We set the distribution of initial conditions so that the model
with social insurance and no initial wealth di®erences best matches the U.S. earnings facts,
setting all other model parameters to the values in Table 2.
Figure 7 shows that the rise in consumption dispersion in our model is less than the rise
in Deaton and Paxson (1994). The rise in the model from age 25 to 60 is approximately
7 log points when shocks are set to our highest point estimate and is approximately 6 log
points when shocks are set to the lowest point estimate. The rise over the life cycle found
by Primiceri and van Rens (2006), using CEX data from 1980 to 2000, is very similar to the
model results for both the high and low shock case.25
To better understand this result, we emphasize that our risky human capital model
decouples the rise in consumption dispersion from the rise in earnings dispersion. At one
24The details for implementating this income tax function within our model follows closely Huggett and
Parra (2006).
25The benchmark model without a social insurance system produces a rise of approximately 16 and 12 log
points from age 25 to 60 in the high and low shock cases, respectively.
21extreme, the model can produce the rise in earnings dispersion with no rise in consumption
dispersion when risk is absent as then initial conditions account for all the rise in earnings
dispersion. What is important for determining the rise in consumption dispersion within
the model is the magnitude of residual risk that remains after taxation and any insurance
opportunities rather than the rise in earnings dispersion.
Finally, we note that our analysis of lifetime inequality is not very sensitive to the in-
clusion of a social insurance system. In the model with social insurance, initial conditions
account for almost the same fraction of the variation in lifetime utility and lifetime earnings
as compared to the benchmark model. Furthermore, in the model with social insurance
the relative importance of variation in initial human capital compared to learning ability
still holds. Speci¯cally, a one standard deviation increase in human capital is, as of age 20,
several times more valuable to an agent compared to a one standard deviation increase in
learning ability.
7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the proximate sources of lifetime inequality. We ¯nd that di®erences
in initial conditions as of a real-life age of 20 account for more of the variation in realized
lifetime utility, lifetime earnings and lifetime wealth than do shocks over the lifetime. Among
initial conditions, a one standard deviation change in human capital is substantially more
important as of age 20 than either a one standard deviation change in learning ability or
initial wealth for how an agent fares in life. A one standard deviation increase in human
capital is equivalent to between a 31 to 34 percent increase in consumption each period,
whereas a one standard deviation increase in learning ability is equivalent to a 6 to 8 percent
increase in consumption. A one standard deviation increase in initial wealth is the least
important and is equivalent to a 4 to 5 percent increase in consumption.
Initial human capital and learning ability are positively correlated in the initial distri-
bution which best matches the earnings distribution facts. This may suggest to some that
the importance of learning ability di®erences relative to human capital di®erences would be
greater if one were to evaluate lifetime inequality at a younger age. Some intuition for this
position would be that learning ability is crystallized before age 20 and that learning ability
di®erences are an important source of human capital di®erences as of age 20. We think
22that such a line of reasoning is valuable to pursue. However, pushing back the age at which
lifetime inequality is evaluated will raise the issue of the importance of one's family more
directly than is pursued here. The importance of one's family and one's environment up to
age 20 is not modeled in our work but is implicitly captured through their impact on initial
conditions: human capital, learning ability and initial wealth.
Our analysis of lifetime inequality is based upon a parsimonious model. Thus, it is easy to
think of initial di®erences or shocks that are not captured by the model. For example, shocks
to mortality, health and preferences or shocks leading to the formation and dissolution of
households are not captured by the model. It is not obvious to us that adding more sources
of shocks will necessarily imply a more important role for shocks. The reason is that initial
di®erences as of a young age may play a role in future health and preference states as well
as a role in who forms households with whom.
In our view the risky human capital framework we have analyzed is likely to be important
for the analysis of a number of economic policies and for many other issues. It has the
potential to replace the standard incomplete-markets model with exogenous earnings or
exogenous wages for both positive and normative analysis. For example, on the policy side,
the framework is ideal to study tax policy. Analyzing the replacement of progressive taxation
by °at-rate taxes in this setting would be of special interest. This follows from the role of
progressive taxes in distorting human capital decisions as well as in reducing labor market
risk, and the corresponding unexplored implications for human capital accumulation. All
these reasons suggest that future work should investigate this framework in more detail.
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26A Appendix
We analyze a dynamic programming formulation of an agent's decision problem. The dynamic
programming problem is given below, where the state is x = (h;k;a). The model implies that
the period borrowing limits should depend upon age, human capital, learning ability and the
distribution of shocks. We impose ability-speci¯c limits k(a) and relax these limits until they are
not binding. We also directly penalize choices leading to negative consumption later in life. This





c + k0 · RjhL + k(1 + r); h0 = z0F(h;l;a); l + L = 1; k0 ¸ k(a)
We compute solutions to this problem by backwards recursion. We use a rectangular grid on the
state variables (h;k) which is learning-ability speci¯c. For each gridpoint and age j, we numerically
solve the maximization problem on the right-hand-side of the Bellman's equation. Evaluating the
objective involves a bi-linear interpolation of Vj+1 across gridpoints.
To compute expectations, we follow Tauchen (1986) and discretize the shock into 5 equally-
spaced values on the log scale. Values range from minus 2 to plus 2 standard deviations from the
mean log-shock. Proceeding in this way gives a computed value function Vj(x) and decision rules
(cj(x);kj(x);Lj(x)) at gridpoints.
Given decision rules at each age, we simulate lifetime histories from the parametric distribution
G(h1;k1;a) of initial conditions described in section 4-6. To simulate histories, we put a grid on
(h1;k1;a). We draw a gridpoint (h1;k1;a) with a probability proportional to the density of the
distribution at (h1;k1;a). For any draw of an initial condition, we also draw a lifetime history of
shocks from the relevant distribution. We calculate realizations of all endogenous variables using
the computed decision rules, initial conditions and shock histories. Earnings statistics are computed
from 40;000 draws of initial conditions and lifetime histories.26
We determine the parameters of the distribution G by minimizing the squared distance of log
model moments from log data moments. The objective of the minimization problem is








where (m1j;m2j;m3j) denote mean earnings, earnings Gini and the mean to median earnings ratio
at age j in the model and where (d1j;d2j;d3j) are the corresponding statistics from U.S. data.
The simplex minimization routine AMOEBA, from Press et. al. (1992), is used to solve this
minimization problem.
28Table 1: Estimation of Human Capital Shocks
Min-Age Max-Age Period N ¾ S.E.(¾) ¾² S.E.(¾²) ¹ s
55 65 1969-2004 125 0.108 (0.029) 0.153 (0.013) 2
50 60 1969-2004 223 0.110 (0.023) 0.157 (0.011) 2
23 60 1969-2004 1521 0.158 (0.010) 0.177 (0.006) 2
55 65 1969-2004 106 0.103 (0.023) 0.149 (0.012) 3
50 60 1969-2004 200 0.104 (0.019) 0.151 (0.010) 3
23 60 1969-2004 1406 0.140 (0.009) 0.178 (0.005) 3
55 65 1969-1981 119 0.088 (0.040) 0.150 (0.015) 2
50 60 1969-1981 225 0.105 (0.027) 0.146 (0.013) 2
23 60 1969-1981 1322 0.152 (0.013) 0.166 (0.008) 2
Note: The entries provide the estimates for ¾ and ¾² for various samples. The ¯rst and second
column provide the minimum and maximum respective age in the sample. The third column
refers to which PSID years are included. The column labeled N refers to the median number
of observation across panel years. Columns labeled S:E: refer to standard errors. The column
denoted ¹ s refers to the maximum s value used in computing log wage di®erences. In estimation
all variance and covariance restrictions are always imposed.
29Table 2: Benchmark Parameter Values
De¯nition Symbol Value
Model Periods J J = 56
Retirement Period JR JR = 42
Interest Rate r r = 0:042
Discount Factor ¯ ¯ = 1:0=(1 + r)
Period Utility Function u(c) u(c) = c(1¡½)
(1¡½)
½ = 2
Rental Rate Rj Rj = (1 + g)j¡1
g = 0:0019
Human Capital Shocks z log(z) » N(¹;¾2)
¾ = 0:088;0:108
¹ = ¡0:029;¡0:031
Law of Motion for Human Capital F(h;l;a) F(h;l;a) = h + a(hl)®
® = 0:675 when ¾ = 0:088
® = 0:625 when ¾ = 0:108
Distribution of Initial Conditions G x ´ (h1;k1;a) » G
discussed in text
30Table 3: Properties of Initial Distributions: Benchmark Model
Low Shock (¾ = 0:088) High Shock (¾ = 0:108)
Statistic ® = 0:625 ® = 0:675 ® = 0:625 ® = 0:675
Mean Learning Ability (a) 0.465 0.373 0.485 0.385
Coe±cient of Variation (a) 0.223 0.213 0.205 0.204
Mean Initial Human Capital (h1) 114.4 116.2 113.3 116.0
Coe±cient of Variation (h1) 0.439 0.432 0.391 0.387
Correlation (a;h1) 0.802 0.720 0.783 0.789
Note: Entries show the moments of the distribution of initial conditions that best match the
pro¯les of mean earnings, earnings dispersion and skewness, at the speci¯ed values of the shock
¾ and the elasticity parameter ®. The elasticity value ® = 0:675 is the best estimate when
¾ = 0:088, whereas ® = 0:625 is the best estimate when ¾ = 0:108.
31Table 4: Sources of Lifetime Inequality: Benchmark Model
Low Shock High Shock
Statistic ¾ = 0:088 ¾ = 0:108
Fraction of Variance in Lifetime Utility
Due to Initial Conditions .731 .621
Fraction of Variance in Lifetime Earnings
Due to Initial Conditions .708 .596
Note: Entries show the fraction of the variance of lifetime utility and lifetime earnings accounted
for by initial conditions (initial human capital and learning ability).
Table 5: Sources of Lifetime Inequality: Model with Initial Wealth Di®erences
Low Shock High Shock
Statistic ¾ = 0:088 ¾ = 0:108
Fraction of Variance in Lifetime Utility
Due to Initial Conditions .770 .663
Fraction of Variance in Lifetime Earnings
Due to Initial Conditions .712 .590
Fraction of Variance in Lifetime Wealth
Due to Initial Conditions .722 .612
Note: Entries show the fraction of the variance of lifetime utility, lifetime earnings and lifetime wealth
accounted for by initial conditions (initial human capital, learning ability and initial wealth). Wealth di®er-
ences are measured directly from PSID data as explained in the text.
32Table 6: Importance of Changes in Initial Conditions: Model with Initial Wealth
Equivalent Variations
Low Shock High Shock
Variable Change in Variable ¾ = 0:088 ¾ = 0:108
Human Capital + 1 st. deviation 34.1 30.7
¡ 1 st. deviation -25.9 -25.4
Learning Ability + 1 st. deviation 7.9 6.4
¡ 1 st. deviation -5.0 -7.6
Initial Wealth + 1 st. deviation 4.7 3.7
¡ 1 st. deviation -2.1 -3.6
Expected Lifetime Wealth
Low Shock High Shock
Variable Change in Variable ¾ = 0:088 ¾ = 0:108
Human Capital + 1 st. deviation 34.3 29.7
¡ 1 st. deviation -23.9 -22.4
Learning Ability + 1 st. deviation 9.9 9.0
¡ 1 st. deviation -5.9 -8.4
Initial Wealth + 1 st. deviation 4.1 2.5
¡ 1 st. deviation -1.4 -2.8
Note: The top panel states equivalent variations, whereas the bottom panel states the percent-
age change in the expected lifetime wealth associated with changes in each initial condition.
The baseline initial condition is set equal to the mean log values of initial human capital,
learning ability and wealth. Changes in initial conditions are also in log units.














Figure 1. Mean Earnings by Age
Note: Figure 1 plots the age e®ects in mean earnings, after controlling for either
time or cohort e®ects based on data from PSID, 1969-2004.
















(a) Variance of Log Earnings




























(c) Earnings Skewness (Mean/Median)
Figure 2. Dispersion and Skewness of Earnings by Age
Note: Figure 2 plots the age e®ects in earnings dispersion and in a measure of
skewness after controlling for either time or cohort e®ects based on data from
the PSID, 1969-2004.

















































(c) Earnings Skewness (Mean/Median)
Figure 3. Earnings in Model and Data
Note: Figure 3 displays the model implications for the age pro¯les of mean earn-
ings, the earnings Gini coe±cient and a measure of earnings skewness. The model
implications are displayed for low shock case (¾ = 0:088) as well as for the high
shock case (¾ = 0:108). The ¯gure also reports the U.S. data counterpart based
on the time e®ects case.















Figure 4. Mean Time in Human Capital Accumulation
Note: Figure 4 plots the age pro¯le for the fraction of time spent in human capital
accumulation, for both speci¯cation of shocks.















(a) Earnings Gini: Eliminating Learning Ability Di®er-
ences















(b) Earnings Gini: Eliminating Shocks
Figure 5. Earnings Dispersion: Learning Ability versus Shocks
Note: Figure 5 is based on the benchmark model with ¾ = 0:108. In Panel (a), all
di®erences in learning ability are eliminated. In Panel (b) shocks are eliminated,
but di®erences in learning ability and initial human capital are the same as in
the benchmark case.



















(a) Lifetime Inequality: ¾ = 0:088



















(b) Lifetime Inequality:¾ = 0:108
Figure 6. Lifetime Inequality and the Elasticity Parameter ®
Note: Figure 6 displays the fraction of the variance in lifetime earnings and utility
due to initial conditions as the elasticity parameter ® varies. In each panel, the
values corresponding to the best estimate of ® are highlighted.
















Figure 7. Rise in Consumption Dispersion: Model and Data.
Note: Figure 7 plots the rise in the variance of log-consumption for ages 25-60
both in U.S. data and the model. The data is based on Deaton and Paxson
(1994) and Primiceri and van Rens (2006). The model results are for the version
of the model with a social insurance system (SI){ see text for details.
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